ECOWAS, DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND THE COUP IN BURKINA FASO FISHER
Augustus Olukayode
Department
of Political Science, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria
Email: [email protected]
KEYWORDS ECOWAS, Democratic, Governance, Coup |
ABSTRACT ECOWAS, since 1991, has adopted various
instruments which, at least in part, focus on the promotion of democratic
governance within member states. Also, for the second time this year,
military officers headed by Captain Ibrahim Traore have seized power in the
West African state of Burkina Faso, saying they acted because former military
ruler, who ousted his democratically elected predecessor in January, failed
to address a growing Islamist insurgency. This paper makes an assessment of
ECOWAS performance in this respect. Also it
discusses the recent developments in Burkina Faso. It concludes by drawing
lessons from both the successes and failures of the ECOWAS experience |
INTRODUCTION
When the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in May 1975, its main
focus was the socio-economic development of the sub-region. Its objective was:
to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activities and
in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of
living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability and
contributing to the progress and development of the African continent (Article
2, ECOWAS Treaty of 1975).
Indeed, none of
the sixty-five articles of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty signed in Lagos contained any
provisions of issues related to security or democratic governance. But it is
now common knowledge that since 1990 when ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, the
Community has become better known for conflict management than its original
objective of regional economic integration. Conflict management has equally
overshadowed the promotion of democratic governance, another important function
of the organization.
Given the manner
in which, over the last two decades and half, warlords have been pillaging the
sub-region for natural resources, coercing disaffected and unemployed youth
into violence and displacing unarmed citizens, it is not surprising that ECOWAS
has been better identified with security. The fact however is that, since 1991,
ECOWAS has adopted four instruments which, at least in part, focus on the
promotion of democratic governance within member states- The 1991 Declaration
of Political Principles; the 1993 Revised Treaty; the 1999 Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security; and
the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (Frempong,
2009)
Focusing on
ECOWAS� role in ensuring democratic governance is of significance because of
the close linkage between democratic governance, peace and regional economic
integration. First, there is an interrelationship between democratic governance
and sustained economic development (Economic Commission for
Africa, 2004). Constitutionalism and rule of law ensure the
political and social stabilization necessary for the pursuit of a long term project like regional integration. It also ensures
human interaction among individuals or groups of different nationalities (Adewoye, 1997). On the other hand, a system of
governance that is devoid of defined mechanisms and structures of
representation or participation undermines the kind of consistent political
commitment and long term legitimacy that regional
integration demands. Concentration of power also makes it difficult to promote
healthy intergovernmental relations and a system of personal rule precludes the
useful role which pressure groups play (Adewoye).
Effective implementation of regional cooperation frameworks therefore will only
take root in healthy and democratic environments where economic management is
both transparent and accountable.
METHOD RESEARCH
The paper adopts an
analytical and descriptive study using secondary sources from reputed published
sources such as books, national and international journals, newspaper articles
and websites from the internet sources. All the collected information is
evaluated and interpreted using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The
paper focuses on the performance of ECOWAS in promoting democratic governance
within the sub-region and the instruments adopted in this respect. Also attempt
to examine the response of ECOWAS to the recent coup in Burkina Faso is carried
out in the study.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The methodical identification and collection of
literature assists the researcher in studying the various facets of the
research data (Aswathy, 2022).
Records have shown that certain theoretical foundation informed the
establishment of the ECOWAS. Integration in the West African sub-region has
largely been informed by the integration processes in Western Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and elsewhere in Africa (Fisher & Oludemi, 2022). Generally, in all areas the main
objectives of integration had been both economic and political. It is
political, when the major concern of members is the political unity of the
component states. On the other hand, it is economic, when the immediate
preoccupation is the promotion of better economic development.
As regards the theoretical approach, the ECOWAS seems
to share functionalism and neo-functionalism with the European Union (EU). The
functionalist theory assumes that integration could be affected through the
creation of a transactional complex of economic and social organization. To
this end, proponents of the functionalist theory such as David Mitrany believed that international activities could be
organized around basic functional needs such as transportation, health and
welfare necessities, cultural activities, trade and production, and common
currency. Also the theory further assumes that the
internationalization of politics and economics would ultimately shift loyalty
and sovereignty from states to international organizations. This philosophical
underpinning, which was expected to guide the integration process in West
Africa, is fraught with some difficulties and has not really impacted on the
ECOWAS.
Similarly, the neo-functionalist approach to West
African integration has not really transformed the ECOWAS into greater height
because the neo-functionalist doctrine of spill-over seems not to be relevant
to developing countries especially in the sphere of politics (Fisher & Oludemi). It has been established that leaders from a
less-developed sub-region like West Africa will not relegate their powers and
political sovereignty to the background, unlike their counterparts in the EU
who are more liberal in this regard.
The neo-functionalist school is especially a modified
version of functionalist and Ernest Hass was the proponent. The central thesis
of the model was that there exists a continuum between economic integration and
political union; this is contrary to the argument put forward by functionalist.
In neo-functionalism, both economic and political factors are believed to be
linked together by the spillover effect through which the various task and
powers of the central institutions are increased while integration gradually
encroaches on the political sensitive area.
African academics have created the new concept of
democratic governance as an alternative to the highly praised idea of �good governance�
put out by the World Bank in reaction to �gross mismanagement by African
government� (Mafeje, 2002).
Democratic governance seeks to connect with the people, their participation in
the institutions and processes of government based on equality of opportunity
and equity, in contrast to good governance, which places emphasis on such
technocratic issue as efficiency, transparency, and accountability in
governments (Mafeje). By making governance
human-centered, democratic governance emphasizes the �social� component of
governing. The logic behind this way of looking at governance is found in the
possibility of �excellent� rule without democracy. As a result, the focus is
placed on some less significant technical and procedural difficulties, leaving
the people- who should be the major subjects of concern in limbo.
The essential component of democratic government is
public engagement, not merely attention to technocratic matters. This is not
meant to minimize the importance of concerns like accountability and openness.
They matter because the welfare of the populace is of the most utmost
importance. In pursuit of justice, welfare, and environmental preservation, Cheema
(2005) defines democratic governance as �the range of mechanisms by
which a society establishes consensus on and implements regulations, human
rights, laws, policies, and social structure.� When defined this way,
democratic governance refers to democratic institutions and procedures that are
used to carry out authoritative value distribution. It focuses on the many
different aspects of democratic processes, such as, elections, access to
justice and the enforcement of human rights norms, decentralization and local
governance capacity.
These several aspects all point to how complicated
governance is. It also demonstrates the need for coordinated actions from many
levels of government, including local, national, regional and international,
across all social strata. Therefore, activities pertinent to some of these
democratic institutions are considered while analyzing the role of regional
organizations, in this instance ECOWAS, in the advancement of democratic
governance.
�INSTRUMENTS ADOPTED BY ECOWAS
Since 1991 ECOWAS has adopted four instruments which,
as mentioned earlier, focus on the promotion of democratic governance within
member states- The 1991 Declaration of Political Principles; the 1993 Revised
Treaty; the 1999 Mechanism; and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance.
The
1991 Declaration
The Declaration of Political Principles, signed in
Abuja, Nigeria on 6 July 1991, enshrined a minimum set of democratic principles
as guidance to member states in their quest for well
established democratic states (Bundu, 1997). It
pledged commitment to the establishment and smooth functioning of democratic
institutions, human rights and rule of law.
In the Preamble, ECOWAS leaders reaffirmed the
objectives of promoting better relations and ensuring a stable and secure
political environment for their peoples to live in freedom under the law. They
also vowed to concert their efforts to promote democracy in the sub-region on
the basis of political pluralism and respect for human rights.
The 1993 Revised Treaty
A committee put together to consider the revision of
the 1975 Treaty took into account the changed circumstances in terms of
governance, peace and stability and worked over the 1991-1992 period. This
eventually emerged as the Revised Treaty of 1993, signed in Cotonou, Benin, on
23 July 1993.
A number of the fundamental principles enshrined in
Article (4) of the new Treaty were governance-related. These included
recognition, promotion and protection of human and people�s rights (Article
49, ECOWAS Treaty of 1993), accountability, economic and social
justice and popular participation and promotion and consolidation of a
democratic system of governance in each member state.
Two institutions provided for in the Revised Treaty
are the Community Parliament and the Community Court of Justice (Article 5(e),
ECOWAS Treaty). In addition, there were provisions for mobilization of various
sections of the population, consultation of civil society groups and press
freedom (Articles 18 & 19, ECOWAS Treaty).
The
1999 Mechanism
The Mechanism was signed on December 1999 in Lome, Togo. Though the focus of the Mechanism is the
prevention, management and resolution of conflict, it adduces to several
governance-related concerns.
In the Preamble, ECOWAS leaders indicate they are
mindful of the Revised Treaty and reaffirm their commitment to the Declaration
of 1991 on freedom, people�s rights and democratization. The leaders further
express awareness of the fact that good governance, the rule of law and
sustainable development are essential for peace and conflict prevention.
�Among the
principles provided for in Article 2 are the promotion and consolidation of a
democratic government as well as democratic institutions in each member state;
and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms and the rules of
international humanitarian laws. Article 20 provided for the creation of a
Council of Elders to use their good offices and experiences to play the role of
mediators, conciliators and facilitators
In Article 25, ECOWAS leaders are empowered to apply
the Mechanism in the event of the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a
democratically elected government. According to Article 42, �ECOWAS shall be
involved in the preparation, organization and supervision of election in member
states. ECOWAS shall also monitor and actively support the development of
democratic institutions of member states.
The
2001 Supplementary Protocol
The 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance is ECOWAS most comprehensive governance-related instrument
(Alexander, 2009). Signed on 21 December 2001, the Protocol is an expression of
a new collective political resolve of ECOWAS member states to take the process
of preventing and resolving violent conflicts forward and to achieve peace and
security through the development of democracy and good governance (WANSED,
2005).
In the Preamble, ECOWAS leaders show concern for the
increasing incidence of conflicts caused by, marginalization and
non-transparent elections and their determination to enhance provisions on the
prevention of internal crises, democracy and good governance, the rule of law,
and human rights.
Section I (Article 1) of the Protocol covers the
constitutional convergence principles which seek to introduce uniformity in the
constitutions of ECOWAS member states. Other provisions in that article covered
secularity and neutrality of the state in religious matters,
non-discrimination, and freedom of the opposition are also guaranteed in
Article 1(i).
The protocol makes crucial provisions on Elections,
Election Monitoring and ECOWAS Assistance in Section 11 and 111 prohibits
substantial modification to electoral laws in the last six months before the
elections, except with the consent of a majority of Political actors; and in
Article 2(2). All the elections shall be organized on the dates or at periods
fixed by the Constitution or the electoral laws.
These provisions are very significant in a sub-region
where majority of leaders are yet to institutionalize an orderly transfer of
political power and politicians do not appreciate politics as a vocation, a
gentlemen�s game, and not a life and death struggle (Alexander). If elections
were conducted peacefully and freely, it would certainly promote peace and
security in the sub-region (Fisher and Oludemi).
The protocol, on elections, further provides for
independent electoral authorities (Article 3); the involvement of civil society
organizations in educating the citizenry particularly the need for peaceful
elections devoid of all acts of violence. Significantly, Article 10 caution
�all holders of power at all levels� against acts of intimidation or harassment
against defeated candidates or their supporters.
Section IV of the Protocol titled �The Role of the
Armed Forces, the Police and Security Forces in a Democracy,� targets a very
important segment of the citizenry whose role in national politics had in the
past impacted negatively on democratic governance. Article 19 emphasizes the
non-partisanship and loyalty of the security agencies to the state, in the
discharge of their duties. Article 20 focuses on civil-security relations;
while the security agencies are to remain �under the authority of legally
constituted authorities, the civilian authorities are in turn to �respect the
apolitical nature� of the agencies.
Article 45 strengthens ECOWAS leaders zero tolerance for
unconstitutional accession to power. Sub-section 1 provides: In the event that
democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is a
massive violation of Human Rights in a Member State, ECOWAS may impose
sanctions on the State concerned.
�ECOWAS JOURNEY IN TERMS OF DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE
To appreciate how far ECOWAS has journeyed in terms of
democratic governance we take a historical sketch of the sub-region.
At the time of its formation, ECOWAS member states
were ruled by either military juntas or sit-tight civilians who presided over
one-party systems. There were eight military regimes among the 15 founding
member states- Ghana, Togo, Benin (then Dahomey), Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso
(then Upper Volta), Mali, and Mauritania. Of the seven civilian regimes four
were one party systems led by the leaders who won them independence- Guinea
then 17years under Sekou Toure, Senegal and Cote d�lvoire then fifteen years each under Leopold Senghor and
Felix Houphouet-Boigny respectively and ten years for Jawara
in The Gambia. Siaka Stevens and his All People�s Party were eight years in power, while William
Tolbert, four years in power in Liberia had been preceded by William Tubman�s
27 years rule. It was only Luis Cabral in newly independent Guinea-Bissau that
had been only a year in office,
The governance-climate had not changed drastically
sixteen years later in 1991 when the Declaration of Political Principles was
adopted. Seven members still had military heads- Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Togo,
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria. Civilian leaders in Cote d�Ivoire, Gambia and
Senegal had been in power for 31years, 26years and 10years respectively. It was
only Benin which had transited to multi-party democracy, while Liberia and
Sierra Leone were bedeviled with internal conflicts. For a sub-region that was
still dominated by undemocratic (military and one party) regimes therefore, the
public declaration in support of democratic governance was a step in the right
direction. But how committed were the leaders of the sub-region to the
declaration.
By mid-1993 when the ECOWAS Revised Treaty was signed,
the democratic wind of change had only succeeded in producing or about to
produce civilianized military presidents in Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea
and Guinea-Bissau. In all these instances long ruling military leaders
supervised transitional elections in which they contested. They emerged
victorious often under acrimonious circumstances and assumed constitutional
first terms. These soldier-turned-presidents were also hopeful of fulfilling
the maximum terms that the constitution they crafted allowed, irrespective of
how long they had stayed as military rulers. It was also ironical that as the
Revised Treaty, crafted by a committee headed by a former military Nigerian
head of state was being signed, an incumbent Nigerian military ruler was in the
process of annulling perhaps the freest and most detribalized election in the
country�s annals and installing a puppet civilian regime (Frempong).
Between the Revised Treaty and the Mechanism (1993
and 1999), the democratic governance record of West Africa was
mixed. On the positive side, Benin made another democratic history when its
1996 elections led to another alternation of power, albeit, it was the return
of former president Kerekou. There were also second
multi-party elections in Ghana and Mali, as well as a �mid-conflict� election
in Sierra Leone. However these gains were negated by
military putsches in Nigeria (1993), The Gambia (1994), Niger (1996), Sierra
Leone (1996, palace coup, and 1997), and a mutiny in Guinea-Bissau
had degenerated into a full scale civil war.
Furthermore, the sub-region witnessed the paradoxical
situation of undemocratic governments, particularly Sani Abacha�s Nigeria,
trying to export democracy into war-weary member states (Sierra Leone and
Liberia). By mid-1999, Nigeria had by divine intervention made a quick
transition to constitutional rule while Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau
were all grappling with different levels of post-conflict situations
(Alexandra).
In December 1999, the ECOWAS Mechanism was called to
test barely two weeks after its adoption by the Ivorian coup of 24 December
1999. One of its signatories, Konan Bedie, had been
overthrown in a coup in direct contravention of Article 25(f) of the Mechanism
which called for ECOWAS intervention in the event of an overthrow of a
democratically elected government. ECOWAS� reaction to the take-over by Robert Guei had serious implication for the Community in terms of
democratic governance, as elaborated below.
The coup no doubt presented ECOWAS with a dilemma.
While it provided an opportunity to test the validity of the Mechanism, the
coup appeared popular within Cote d�Ivoire. Worse still, at the Lome summit, Bedie had scuttled
attempts by some sub-regional leaders to discuss the tense situation in his
country following the disqualification of Ouattara, dismissing it as a little
legal matter that could be sorted out internally. And yet when it did happen, Bedie rushed to Accra and Abuja in search of support. As it
were the coup threw a cat among the pigeons and dared
ECOWAS for action
The events following Guei�s
failed attempt to scuttle the electoral process in October 2000, set Cote
d�Ivoire on its path of self-destruction for which several subsequent attempts
by ECOWAS has failed to reverse. Perhaps, if ECOWAS
had in 1999 insisted on a democratic regime change, it could have been spared
the trouble of managing a more complicated crisis.
As it were, by the start of the new millennium, coups,
rebellions, civil wars and general militarization of society had virtually
eclipsed whatever progress in terms of democratic governance had been achieved
in the sub-region since the 1991 Declaration.
THE
COUP IN BURKINA FASO
A former French colony till 1960, Burkina Faso has a
long history of military rule and coups. Former President Blaise Compaore, who took power in 1983, was ousted in a popular
uprising in 2014 after attempting to amend the constitution to extend his rule.
Elections were held in 2015 and in 2020, when President Roch
Marc Christian Kabore was re-elected in polls that
was considered to be fair but marred by ongoing insecurity.
On January 24, 2022 the military overthrew Kabore and seized power. Coup leader Lieutenant-Colonel
Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba
became head of the military-led Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and
Restoration MPSR that replaced the government. The military blamed Kabore�s failure to halt an insurgency by jihadist groups
in the north.
However, Kabore�s ousting was
not unexpected, according to Ochieng (BBC, 2022),
discontent among security forces had been growing over the lack of support. She
notes this was exacerbated further by reports that security forces at a
military base in Inata had run out of food in the weeks
before they were attacked by an armed group in November 2021. Forty-nine
military police officers and four civilians were killed in the attacks.
Residents of Burkina Faso on Friday 30 September woke
up to the sounds of heavy gunfire near the main military camp and residential
areas of the capital, Ouagadougou. A large blast also rang out near the
presidential palace. The coup was confirmed by army Captain Ibrahim Traore who
announced that former military ruler Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo
Damiba had been deposed and his government dissolved.
The MPSR subsequently appointed Traore as President and head of the armed
forces. Traore has since announced plans to hold a national meeting on 14 and
15 October to select a transitional President.
In ousting Damiba, Traore
gave the same reason as his predecessor; the failure to address the Islamist
insurgency. In a written statement, Traore said that, faced with a
deteriorating situation, they had tried to persuade Damiba
to refocus the transition on the security question. The statement went on to
say �Damiba�s actions gradually convinced us that his
ambitions were diverting away from what we set out to do. We decided this day
to remove Damiba� (Reuters, 2022).
In recent years, Burkina Faso has replaced Mali as the
epicenter of Islamist violence in the Sahel, according to Heni
Nsaibia (Nsaibia,
2022). There have been devastating attacks on civilians in recent
years. More than 130 people were killed by armed militants in the northern town
of Solhan in June 2021, believed to be the deadliest
attack for years. An attack on Seytenga in June 2022
prompted almost 16,000 people to leave their homes. UNHCR says Burkina Faso�s
displacement crisis is �one of the world�s fastest growing� with an estimated
1.9 million people internally displaced (UNHCR, 17 June 2022).
The Government has also struggled to assert authority,
and controls only 60% of the country, according to Mahamadou
Issoufou, a former president of Niger and ECOWAS� mediator to Burkina Faso (Al
Jazeera, 2021). Jihadist groups have blockaded northern towns, and
just before the latest coup, an Al Qaeda affiliated group claimed
responsibility for an attack on a supply convoy near Gaskinde
that resulted in the deaths of 27 soldiers and 10 civilians (Al
Jazeera, 2022). The trucks were heading for Djibo,
which has reportedly been under an effective blockade by jihadist groups for
months (Al Jazeera).
The latest coup in Burkina Faso is the most recent in
West Africa where countries like Chad, Mali and Guinea recently experienced
coups. The country has been locked in a conflict with militant groups linked to
Islamic State and al-Qaida for almost seven years, experiencing its second coup
in eight months. ECOWAS is expected to establish relations with the new junta
leader, Captain Ibrahim Traore, and to reinforce a two year
transition period for the country to return to democracy set up under the
previous junta.
Burkina Faso is seen as a strategic lynchpin in the
western Sahel conflict, with terrorism already spreading from its southern
border to West Africa�s coastal states. ECOWAS has a major stake in Burkina
Faso�s success in security matters. According to Michael Shurkin,
an analyst with 14 North Strategies, a Washington based consultancy, if Burkina
Faso falls, or as it falls, it puts in danger a lot of other countries that
surround Burkina Faso. Thousands have died in Burkina Faso due to the conflict,
almost two million people have been displaced, representing roughly 10% of the
country�s twenty two million population.
Damiba, who has
reportedly fled to neighboring Togo, offered his resignation under seven
conditions, which Traore accepted- including a promise that the country would
continue with the commitments made to the ECOWAS on a two
year transition to democratic power.
However, it is increasingly likely that in seeking to
reduce attacks by armed groups and thereby keep themselves in power, the new
coup leaders will join Mali and pursue support from the Wagner Group, a private
military company founded by Russia Oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Burkinabe soldiers see the relative success that the Wagner Group had in
seizing back territories from armed militias in the Central African Republic
and in preventing rebels from deposing its government.
Russia has sought closer ties with African countries
wracked by insecurity by offering military arms and support. Damiba had started on a path of cooperation with ECOWAS,
having so far held out against Russia�s offer to train Burkinabe troops. He
also allowed former President Blaise Compraore back
into the country within a framework of national reconciliation, despite Compraore�s life sentence for the murder of Sankara. Many felt Damiba was
becoming more of a politician than a military leader who could succeed against
the jihadists.
The future of these relations will partly depend on
how the Western powers support the new authorities. But what is certain is that
part of the public opinion which supported this counter coup will continue to
demand a shift in favor or Russia.
Russian flags were waved by some of Traore�s�
supporters in Ouagadougou due to grievances against former colonial power
France. Meanwhile, the French Embassy was attacked by angry protesters after an
officer said France was sheltering Damiba at a French
military base and that he was planning a counteroffensive. Both Damiba and French authorities have denied those
allegations. Demonstrators also attacked the French cultural center in
Bobo-Dioulasso, the country�s second largest city.
ECOWAS RESPONSE TO THE COUP
ECOWAS, the regional grouping of West African
countries, condemned �in the strongest terms� the seizure of power and
reaffirmed its �unreserved condemnation of any seizure or retention of power by
unconstitutional means (ECOWAS, 1 October 2022, Communiqu� of the ECOWAS
Commission on the Socio-Political situation in Burkina Faso).
The West Africa regional bloc, ECOWAS, has suspended
Burkina Faso in the aftermath of the military coup, making it the third member
to be punished for a military takeover in only eighteen months. ECOWAS said it
found the new coup inappropriate at a time when progress had been made in
ensuring an orderly return to constitutional order in Burkina Faso.
ECOWAS reaffirmed its unreserved opposition to any
seizure or retention of power by unconstitutional means and demands the
scrupulous respect of the timetable already agreed with the Transitional
Authorities for a rapid return to constitutional order.
Ghanaian President Nana Addo Dankwa
Akufo-Addo, the current ECOWAS chairman, called the recent spate of coups in
West Africa a direct violation of our democratic tenets. In the past eighteen
months, the fifteen nation ECOWAS has suspended two other members- Guinea and
Mali- where coups have occurred.
ECOWAS suspended neighboring Mali after a coup there
in August 2020 and then took similar action against Guinea after the President
was overthrown in September 2021. Mali is also under punishing economic
sanctions, including flight bans and asset freezes, after its coup leader
failed to organize elections within eighteen months as promised.
The latest suspension on Burkina Faso has very little
effect as the sanctions put in place in Guinea and Mali has done very little to
change things. ECOWAS has faced criticisms for its handling of the coups,
particularly in Mali where mediators negotiated with the military government on
the eighteen month deadline for holding democratic
elections. Mali�s coup leader has said that will not be met, citing security
conditions, and has announced a vote to take place four years from now instead.
ECOWAS representatives had been doubling their efforts
in neighboring Mali to negotiate the release of Ivory Coast soldiers that the
Malian junta had deemed mercenaries. ECOWAS mediators arrived in Ouagadougou on
Tuesday to demonstrations against the bloc�s delegates. As a result, the
meeting with the junta had to be held at the airport.
Traore�s comments so far suggest he is open to working
with all international partners excluding France, who Burkinabe perceive as
having worsened civilian casualties in the region. The junta could also seek
out the assistance of Turkey, which has increased its military sales to Africa.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that while
constitutionalism has assumed new prominence in West Africa in the last two
decades, compliance with the constitutions and the law is often vulnerable and
minimalist, rendering ineffective the basic constitution-guaranteed rights and
freedoms. Under the circumstances, a lot more needs to be done both at the
level of ECOWAS and within member states in translating the rhetoric on
democratic governance and stability into practice.
At
the sub-regional level, the following should be made priority:
ECOWAS should design ways to mitigate elements that lead to
political breakdown and coups. Issues which should be of regional concern
include clear breaches of the constitution by a state�s own government, rigged
or suspect elections, clear and significant breaches of human rights including
exclusionary practices, high and continuing level of corruption.
ECOWAS should monitor the constitutions of member states to ensure
that they abide by regional standards with particular reference to term limits.
To this end, the Secretariat is to prepare annual reports on transparency and
good governance in each of its member states.
The ECOWAS Parliament as presently has practically no oversight
role and lack powers to enforce its decisions and to elicit compliance from
member states. To be effective, therefore, the ECOWAS Parliament should be
empowered to censure erring governments and to have the power to order
international investigation into reported and suspected cases of human rights
abuses.
Within
each member states, the following should be prioritized:
The government needs to accept a tacit level of supervision of
their domestic politics by other states within the region, permitting regional
mediation between governments and opposition forces, a measure of external
pressure where this is needed to induce compliance.
There is also an urgent need for social dialogue among stakeholders
in the political process to ensure the minimizing of bitterness, avoiding the
stigmatization of others, and broad consensus on the rules of the game. The
introduction of inter-Party Advisory Committee which has worked so well in
Ghana is recommended. To ensure some level playing ground, it is essential that
there is some form of state funding of political parties.
Civil societies should be empowered not only as a means of
expanding political participation but also to promote popular vigilance and
enhance the watchdog role of civic actors and citizens groups. The massive and
vigorous manner in which the National Civil Coalition against Third Term Agenda
in Nigeria pressured the national legislature to reject the amendment to lift
the two-term is worth emulating.
In conclusion, the constraints that persist in the form of institutional
resources and of socio-cultural practices need to be addressed, if the vision
of a truly representative and participative system is to be fully translated
into reality. In particular, West African leaders should be constantly reminded
that power entails responsibilities to protect, care for and be accountable, to
the people. What is required within the sub-region is not the mere trappings of
democratic changes, but a change of mentality by leaders in particular and West
Africans in general, consistent with constitutional rule and better
appreciation of the rule of law in a modern state. The success of the
governance protocols depends on the democratic credentials and actions of their
subscribers. And on this matter, ECOWAS should not glorify itself with
half-victories.
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(2022)
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