Volume 4, Number 2, February 2023 e-ISSN: 2797-6068 and p-ISSN: 2777-0915
THE EFFECT OF TAX PLANNING, CAPITAL INTENSITY
AND EARNING POWER ON EARNING MANAGEMENT WITH INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AS A
MODERATING VARIABLE
Vania Maria Djojo,
Christina Dwi Astuti
Universitas
Trisakti, Indonesia
Email:
[email protected], [email protected]
|
KEYWORDS Tax Planning, Capital Intensity, Earning
Power, Institutional Ownership and Earning Management |
ABSTRACT The purpose of this research is to examine the factors that influence
earnings management in consumer goods manufacturing companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange. These factors are Tax Planning, Capital Intensity,
Earning Power and Institutional Ownership as moderating variables. The
population used in this research is all consumer goods industry companies
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2021. The sample in this
study is 116 data that match the criteria. Samples were selected using
purposive sampling method. The results of this study indicate that tax
planning has a positive effect on earnings management, capital intensity has
a negative effect on earnings management and institutional ownership weakens
the effect of tax planning on earnings management. Meanwhile, the variables
of earning power, financial leverage and company age have no effect on
earnings management and institutional ownership cannot weaken the effect of
capital intensity and earning power on earnings management |
INTRODUCTION
The condition of an
enterprise can be described by the financial statements generated in the
accounting process. Financial statements are also used as a reference in
decision-making and a source of information for users of financial statements,
so that financial reports have an important role for users of financial
statements. One of the purposes of making financial statements is to report the
condition of the company to outside parties. Financial statements consist of
several types such as statements of financial position, income statements,
retained earnings statements, cash flows and notes to financial statements.
However, the income statement is one of the most concerned statements by users
of financial statements, this is because the income statement presents
information related to the company's performance in the form of profit or loss.
Profit describes the company's performance as good, but if it is a loss, it
means that the company's performance is less than optimal. If the company gain profits,
the company can distribute dividends to shareholders, so that management takes
action to produce reports that are in line with management's expectations. (Achyani & Lestari, 2019).
Earnings management occurs
because there is an agency problem, where there are differences in interests
between investors (shareholders) and the company (management). These
differences in interests can affect the actions to be taken by the management.
Earnings management does not necessarily manipulate information, but rather is
associated with the selection of selected accounting methods with specific
intentions and goals, such as the personal profit of a particular party. This
agency concern occurs due to hidden actions and hidden information. Hidden
action is the actions, behavior, or morals of good managers can avoid the
occurrence of agency problems, while hidden information is one of the parties
having more information related to the company. Efforts to avoid this agency
problem can cause costs called agency costs. This agency cost is divided into
3, namely: (1) monitoring costs, (2) bonding costs, and (3) residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 2019).
Earnings management is
divided into 4 patterns, namely: (1) taking a bath, (2)
income minimization, (3) income maximization, and (4) income smoothing (Scott, 2015). Earnings
management occurs due to several factors, namely wanting to get large bonuses,
having good company value, and avoiding government policies. Techniques in
manipulating company profits are grouped into 3, namely: (1) taking
opportunities in determining the company's accounting estimates, (2) changing
the company's accounting methods and also (3) changing / transferring /
shifting the company's revenue or cost period (Siallagan, 2020)
Theoretical Framework
Agency Theory
Agency
theory describes the relationship between the principal and the agent, where
there is a principal party who is a shareholder or investor as the authorizer
and the agent are the management party or company that receives the authority (Jensen & Meckling,
2019). The relationship between
principal and agent has the potential for differences in the interests of each
party due to personal interests. Sometimes the agent or management acts not in
accordance with the expectations desired by the principal so that differences
in interests will create agency problems.
Agency
problems occur because of hidden actions and hidden information. Hidden action
is a good manager's behavior or morale that can avoid agency problems. While
hidden information is the existence of one party who has additional information
about the company, such as managers who know more about the condition of the
company. This can be used by parties who have superior information to carry out
improper actions.
The
costs incurred to avoid the occurrence of agency problems are called agency
costs.� Agency costs are divided into
three according to (Jensen & Meckling,
2019) namely:
��� Monitoring costs are costs borne by the principal in monitoring
agents or companies, such as observing, controlling, and measuring agents.
��� Bonding cost is the cost borne by the agent in complying with and
establishing a mechanism in ensuring that the agent works in accordance with
the interests of the principal.
��� Residual loss is a sacrifice that reduces principal prosperity due
to differences in decisions between principal and agent.
(Eisenhardt,
1989) states that the theory of
agency is explained using three basic human nature assumptions, namely (1)
self-interest, (2) bounded rationality and (3) risk averse.
Tax Planning
Tax
planning is a process of managing the business of individual or corporate
taxpayers in such a way by using various loopholes that can be reached by
companies based on the provisions of tax regulations so that companies can
minimize their tax payments. So tax planning is referred to as engineering
activities so that the tax burden becomes lower by taking advantage of the
loopholes of existing tax regulations but does not violate the law and cannot
be blamed as an act of tax evasion. The purpose of tax planning is to minimize
the tax burden owed, maximize profit after tax, minimize the occurrence of tax
surprises in the event of tax inspection by the fiscus and fulfill tax
obligations correctly, efficiently and effectively. There are 2 types of tax
planning, namely national tax planning and international tax planning (Prasetyo, Riana, &
Masitoh, 2019).
Capital
Intensity
Capital intensity describes the proportion of fixed
assets owned by the company from the company's overall assets. Companies that
have a high capital intensity ratio will tend to manipulate profits
because they want to get a bigger profit (Ramadhani,
Latifah, & Wahyuni, 2017). Companies that
have a high capital intensity ratio tend to manipulate profits and have
a positive effect on earnings management because they have high fixed assets so
that management has the opportunity to do earnings management (Fitriani,
Nurhayati, & Sukarmanto, 2017).
Earning
Power
Earning Power shows the ability of management to make
a profit from the company's assets; thus management will carry out earnings
management to show shareholders the good performance of the company. The effect
of showing that the earning power that will encourage the company to do
earnings management will be weakened by the presence of an independent
commissioner. An independent commissioner will perform the function of
supervising the company's performance, so management cannot easily carry out
earnings management (Setijaningsih
& Merisa, 2022).
�Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership is the number of shares of a
company owned by an institution or institutions such as insurance companies,
banks, investment companies and other institutional holdings. Institutional
ownership has a fairly important function in supervising management because
institutional ownership can encourage more optimal supervision (Saniamisha
& Jin, 2019)
Company
Size
Company size is measured based on the number of assets
owned. The smaller the size of the company, the higher the possibility of the
company doing earnings management in attracting the attention of investors
because the size of a small company has lower total assets. Meanwhile,
companies that have a large size are likely to carry out earnings management
intending to avoiding profit fluctuations. With companies manipulating their
profits with earnings management, it is increasingly attractive for investors
and the government to put shares in the company (Gayatri
& Wirasedana, 2021).
Financial
Leverage
Financial leverage describes the proportion of debt in
financing its investments. Companies that have higher leverage also have high
risks because companies need more assets in paying off their obligations (Sari
& Darmawati, 2021).
Company
Age
The age of the company is the time when the company
has been operating since its inception. Usually, investors will trust a
long-established company rather than a newly established company. This is
because a company that has been established for a long time is considered to
provide a greater profit margin compared to a newly established company. As
Time goes by (Kalbuana, Suryati,
& Pertiwi, 2022)
Hypothesis
Development
Tax
Planning and Earnings Management
(Prasetyo
et al., 2019) states
that there is a positive influence of tax planning on earning management,
meaning that the higher the tax planning, the higher the probability of earning
management. Companies that have gone public tend to have a high profile than
companies that have not yet gone public, so companies want to display the
company's performance results as well as possible. Management will minimize
taxes to increase the company's net profit because taxes are one of the
elements of profit reduction.
In line with the research that has been carried out by
(Baraja, Basri, &
Sasmi, 2019) and (Faqih & Sulistyowati, 2021) who concluded that tax
planning is positive for earnings management so that the formulation of the hypothesis
in this study is as follows.�
Ha1
Tax planning has a positive effect on earnings management.
Capital
Intensity and Earnings Management
Capital intensity describes the proportion of fixed
assets owned by the company from the company's overall assets. Companies that
have a high capital intensity ratio will tend to manipulate profits because
they want to get a bigger profit (Ramadhani
et al., 2017). Companies that have high capital
intensity can make managers motivated in making earnings management by
acknowledging sales faster than they should to make capital intensity lower and
profit for the current year increase (Fitriani
et al., 2017).
In line with the research that has been carried out by (Fitriani
et al., 2017)
which
concludes that capital intensity has a positive effect on earnings
management so that the� formulation of
the hypothesis in this study is as follows.
Ha2
Capital intensity has a positive effect on earnings management.
Earning
Power and Earnings Management
Earning power is often used by potential investors to
assess the level of efficiency and ability of a company to make a profit.
Investors assume that high earning power will guarantee a return on investment
and will provide a decent return. Earning Power using Return on Assets (ROA)
will explain the efficiency of the company by looking at the size of operating
profit in relation to the company's assets. Conflicts of interest between
management and owners arising from agency relationships can trigger management
to carry out earnings management. Management incentives are based on the
company's ROA so that in the end it will trigger management to carry out
earnings management to achieve the desired targets. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the higher the company's ROA value, the higher the possibility
of management in carrying out earnings management (Setijaningsih
& Merisa, 2022).
In line with the research that has been conducted by (Setijaningsih
& Merisa, 2022)
which
concluded that �earning power has
a positive effect on earnings management so that the formulation of hypotheses
in this study is as follows.�
Ha3
Earning power has a positive effect on earnings management.
Institutional
ownership in moderating the effect of tax planning on Earnings Management
(Sari
& Darmawati, 2021) Earnings
management is the manager's action in manipulating company profits by utilizing
certain accounting policies. One form of utilization of accounting policies is
to carry out tax planning. Institutional ownership allegedly moderates between
tax planning and earnings management. If the company has implemented
institutional ownership, it can weaken the influence of tax planning practices
on earnings management. The same goes for the size of the company. Small and
large companies tend to do earnings management to attract investors so that if
the company has implemented institutional ownership, the influence of earnings
management can be reduced.
With the existence of institutions that have shares in
the company, there will be parties who monitor the actions taken by companies,
especially companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. With the aim of
reducing opportunistic actions that can harm stakeholders, namely by increasing
the credibility and transparency of the company so that the possibility of the
company doing earnings management is smaller.
In line with the�
research conducted by (Sari
& Darmawati, 2021) which
concluded that� institutional ownership
weakens the influence of tax planning on earnings management so that the
formulation of hypotheses in this study is as follows.�
Ha4
institutional ownership weakens the effect of tax planning on earnings
management.
Institutional
ownership in moderating the effect of capital intensity on Earnings Management
Capital intensity describes the proportion of fixed
assets owned by the company from the company's overall assets. With
institutional ownership, especially the ownership of institutional parties in
the company, management is more careful in committing fraudulent actions such
as earnings management. With the increasing number of institutions that have
shares in the company, companies do not do earnings management by lowering the
capital intensity ratio to get greater profits. Based on this discussion, the
formulation of hypotheses in this study is as follows.
Ha5
institutional ownership weakens the effect of capital intensity on earnings
management.
Institutional
ownership in moderating the effect of earning power on Earnings Management
(Setijaningsih
& Merisa, 2022)
stated
that earning power shows management's ability to generate profits from company
assets; thus management will carry out earnings management to show shareholders
good company performance. The effect of showing that the earning power that
will encourage the company to do earnings management will be weakened by the
presence of an independent commissioner. An independent commissioner will
perform the function of supervision of the company's performance, so management
cannot easily carry out earnings management.
In line with research conducted by (Setijaningsih
& Merisa, 2022)
which
concluded that institutional ownership weakens the influence of earning
power on earnings management.� So
that the formulation of the hypothesis in this study is as follows.
Ha6
institutional ownership weakens the effect of earning power on earnings
management.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample
Selection
The sample selection used in this study was the
purposive sampling method. The population used in this study is a consumer
goods industry company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2018 to
2021.
Table 1
Sample selection results
|
Information |
Number of companies |
|
A
consumer goods industry company that is consistently listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2021. |
45 |
|
Companies
whose financial statements do not end on December 31 from 2018 to 2021. |
(0) |
|
Companies
that do not use rupiah currency units in the period from 2018 to 2021. |
(0) |
|
Companies
that did not book profits during the�
period 2018 to 2021. |
(14) |
|
Companies
that do not have institutional ownership during the period 2018 to 2021. |
(2) |
|
Samples
used in the study |
29 |
|
Research Period |
4 years |
|
Total
Observations |
116 |
Dependent
Variables
Earnings
Management
The Modified Jones Model is used to
identify companies that carry out accrual management. The earnings management
measurement scale uses a ratio scale. Earnings management proxies are
calculated using the Modified Jones Model taken from the research of
Gayatri and Wirasedana (2021).
TAit = Net Income � Cash flow from operating
(TACit/TAit-1) = β1(1/TAit-1) + β2((ΔREVt-Δ
RECt)/TAit-1) + β3(PPEit/TAit-1)]
+ e�
NDACit = β1(1/TAit-1) + β2((ΔREVt-Δ RECt)/TAit-1)
+ β3(PPEit/TAit-1)�
DACit = (TACit/TAit-1) - NDACit
Information:
Tait���������������� : total accruals in period t������
TAit-1������������ : total assets at the end of the
year t-1
ΔREV
t���������� : change in income from year
t-1 to year t
ΔREC
t���������� : change of receivables from
year t-1 to year t
PPEit�������������� : gross property, plant and equipment
in year t
DACit������������ : discretionary asccruals in period
t���
NDACit���������� : nondiscretionary accruals in period
t
β
1, β 2, β3����� : regression
coefficient
e��������������������� : error�
Independent
Variables
Tax
Planning
Tax planning measurement using a ratio scale with a
proxy of tax planning variables was taken from the research of (Gayatri
& Wirasedana, 2021).
Tax Retention Rate =� 
Net Income����������������������������� :
The company's net profit i in year t.
Pretax Income (EBT
it)��������� : Profit before corporate tax i year
t.
Capital
Intensity
The measurement of capital intensity using a ratio
scale with a proxy of capital intensity variables is taken from the research of (Ramadhani
et al., 2017)
Capital Intensity = 
Earning
Power
The measurement of earning power using a ratio scale
with a proxy variable of earning power is taken from the research of (Setijaningsih
& Merisa, 2022).
Earning Power = 
Moderation Variables
Institutional Ownership
The measurement of institutional ownership using a ratio scale
with a proxy of institutional ownership variables is taken from (Febriyanti,
2022).
Institutional ownership = 
Control Variables
Company Size
The measurement of company size using a ratio scale with a proxy
variable company size is taken from the research of (Gayatri
& Wirasedana, 2021).
Company Size = Log (Total Assets)
Leverage
The measurement of financial leverage using a ratio scale with a
proxy of financial leverage variables is taken from (Vega,
2022).
Leverage = 
Company
Age
The measurement of the company's age using a ratio scale with the
company's umuer variable proxy was taken from the research of (Kalbuana
et al., 2022).
Company Age = Year
of research � Year of establishment of the company
Descriptive
Statistical Analysis
Table
2
Descriptive
Statistics
|
N |
Mean |
Max |
Min |
Std Dev |
|
|
EM |
116 |
-0.009353 |
0.068768 |
-0.051496 |
0.017217 |
|
TP |
116 |
0.738358 |
1.051465 |
0.185383 |
0.107210 |
|
CI |
116 |
0.347982 |
0.762247 |
0.040647 |
0.165559 |
|
EP |
116 |
1.158942 |
3.157465 |
0.387332 |
0.533828 |
|
CS |
116 |
29.161.09 |
32.82039 |
25.95468 |
1.540120 |
|
FL |
116 |
0.384191 |
0.792736 |
0.130336 |
0.159531 |
|
UP |
116 |
43.91379 |
92.00000 |
9.000000 |
19.39008 |
Source: Results of
Data Processing Through Eviews v.12
Based on the results of descriptive statistical
analysis in table 2, the tax planning �(TP) variable during 2018 to 2021 shows an
average value (mean) of 0.738358, the highest value (maximum) of
1.051465, namely PT Nippon Indosari Corpindo Tbk (ROTI), the lowest value
(minimum) of 0.185383 namely PT Sekar Bumi Tbk (SKBM) and the standard deviation
of 0.107210.
The capital intensity (CI) variable during 2018
to 2021 shows an average value (mean) of 0.347982, the highest value (maximum)
of 0.762247, namely PT Sariguna Primatirta Tbk (CLEO), the lowest value (minimum)
of 0.040647, namely PT Hartadinata Aba (HRTA) and a standard deviation of
0.165559.
The variable earning power (EP) during 2018 to
2021 shows an average value (mean) of 1.158942, the highest value (maximum)
of 3.157465, namely PT Cahaya Kalbar Tbk (CEKA), the lowest value (minimum) of
0.387332, namely PT Integra Indocabinet Tbk (WOOD) and the standard deviation
of 0.533828.
The company size (CS) variable during 2018 to
2021 shows an average value (mean) of 29,161.09, the highest value (maximum)
of 32.82039, namely PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk (INDF), the lowest value (minimum)
of 25.95468, namely PT Pyridam Farma Tbk (PYFA) and a standard deviation of
1.540120.
The financial leverage (FL) variable during
2018 to 2021 shows an average value (mean) of 0.384191, the highest
value (maximum) of 0.792736, namely PT Pyridam Farma Tbk (PYFA), the
lowest value (minimum) of 0.130336, namely PT Industri Jamu dan Farmasi
Sido Tbk (SIDO) and the standard deviation of 0.159531.
The variable age of the company (UP) during 2018 to
2021 shows an average value (mean) of 43.91379, the highest value (maximum)
of 92 namely PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk (MLBI), the lowest value (minimum)
of 9, namely PT Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk (ICBP) and the standard
deviation of 19.39008.
Panel
Data Model Analysis
Table
3
Chow
Test
|
Effects Test |
Statistics |
d.f |
Prob. |
|
|
Cross-Section
F |
9.970749 |
(28,78) |
0,0000 |
|
|
Cross-Section
Chi-Square |
176.497916 |
��� 28 |
0,0000 |
|
Source: Results of
Data Processing Through Eviews v.12
Based on the results of the Chow Test in Table 3, it
shows that Prob. Cross-Section chi-square of 0.0000. This means that
0.0000 < 0.05 then Ha is accepted (Ha = Fixed Effect Model).
Table
4
Hausman
Test
|
Test Summary |
Chi-Sq.Statistic |
Chi-sq. d.f |
Prob. |
|
|
Cross-Section
Random |
30.165893 |
��� 9 |
0,0004 |
|
Source: Results of
Data Processing Through Eviews v.12
Based on the results of the Hausman Test in Table 4,
it shows that Prob. Cross-section random of 0.0001. This means that
0.0004 < 0.05 then Ha is accepted so that the selected model is fixed
effect.
Hypothesis
Testing
The following is a table of the results of testing the
hypothesis of each independent variable in the study which consists of the
variables of tax planning, capital intensity, earning power, company size,
financial leverage and company age on earnings management and institutional
ownership as moderating variables.
Table
5
Hypothesis
Test
|
Variable |
Coefficient |
T-Statistics |
Sig. |
Information |
|
TP |
0.070816 |
2.543516 |
0.0130 |
H1
accepted |
|
CI |
-0.123576 |
-1.968128 |
0.0526 |
H2
not accepted |
|
EP |
-0.001394 |
-0.079617 |
0.9367 |
H3
not accepted |
|
TP_KI |
-0.076053 |
-2.176008 |
0.0330 |
H4
accepted |
|
CI_KI |
0.118288 |
1.556257 |
0.1237 |
H5
not accepted |
|
EP_KI |
-0.017072 |
-0.790372 |
0.4317 |
H6
not accepted |
|
.CS |
-0.027751 |
-5.026735 |
0.0000 |
|
|
FL |
-0.016348 |
-1.441751 |
0.1534 |
|
|
UP |
0.000298 |
0.376782 |
0.7074 |
|
|
C |
0.812273 |
5.506839 |
0.0000 |
|
|
Adjusted
R-Squared |
|
0.814592 |
|
|
|
Prob
(F-Statistic) |
|
0.000000 |
|
|
Source: Results of
Data Processing Through Eviews v.12
Based on the table above, the regression model
obtained is as follows:
EM
= 0.812273 + 0.070816TP � 0.123576CI � 0.001394EP � 0.076053TP_KI + 0.118288
CI_KI � 0.017072EP_KI � 0.027751CS � 0.016348FL + 0.000298UP + e
Based on the table above, it shows an adjusted value of R2 of 0.814592 which means that the variation of
the dependent variable can be explained by the variation of the independent
variable of 81.4592%. While the remaining 18.5408% is explained by other
variables that were not contained in the study.
Based on the table above, it shows the value of Sig. Prob. (F-statistic) of 0.000000 which means
that all independent variables affect the dependent variables.
The
Effect of Tax Planning on Earnings Management
Based on the table above, it shows that the value of
sig. �tax planning (TP) variable
0.0065 < 0.05 so that it can be concluded that H1 is accepted and has a
positive regression coefficient direction with earnings management. This shows
that the higher the tax planning, the higher the probability of earnings
management. Companies that have gone public tend to have a high profile
than companies that have not yet gone public, so companies want to
display the company's performance results as well as possible. The results of
this study are consistent with the results of the research of (Prasetyo
et al., 2019) and (Baraja
et al., 2019).
The
Effect of Capital Intensity on Earnings Management
The capital intensity (CI) variable has a sig.
value of 0.0263 < 0.05 so it can be concluded that H2 is not accepted. This
shows that the greater the company's capital intensity ratio, the smaller the
possibility of the company carrying out earnings management actions.
The
Effect of Earning Power on Earnings Management
The earning power (EP) variable has a sig.
value of 0.46835 < 0.05 so it can be concluded that H3 is not accepted, This
shows that earning power has no influence on earnings management.� So that the size of the company's profit does
not affect the company in carrying out earnings management actions. A high level
of sales in a company, will not necessarily bring high profits either.� The results of this study are consistent with
the research results of (Agustia
& Suryani, 2018) and (Purnama
& Taufiq, 2021).
The
role of institutional ownership in moderating tax planning on earnings
management
����������� The role of institutional ownership
in moderating tax planning on earnings management has a sig. value of 0.0165
< 0.005 so it can be concluded that H4 is accepted so that institutional
ownership can weaken the effect of tax planning on earnings management.
This shows that with the existence of institutions that have shares in the
company, there will be parties who monitor the actions taken by the company,
especially companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. With the aim of
reducing opportunistic actions that can harm stakeholders, namely by increasing
the credibility and transparency of the company so that the possibility of the
company doing earnings management is smaller. The results of this study are
consistent with the research results of (Sari
& Darmawati, 2021).
The
role of institutional ownership in moderating capital intensity on
earnings management
The role of institutional ownership in moderating capital
intensity on earnings management has a sig value. 0.06185 < 0.05 so it can
be concluded H5 is not accepted, This indicates that the role of institutional
ownership cannot weaken the effect of capital intensity on earnings management.
The
role of institutional ownership in moderating earnings power on earnings
management
The role of institutional ownership in moderating earnings power
on earnings management has a sig value. 0.21585 < 0.05 so it can be
concluded H6 is not accepted, This indicates that the
role of institutional ownership cannot weaken the effect of earnings power on
earnings management.
CONCLUSION
Based on the results of research and testing conducted
on 116 data samples during the period 2018 to 2021, it can be concluded that
tax planning has a positive influence on earnings management, capital intensity
has a negative influence on earnings management and institutional ownership
weakens the influence of tax planning on earnings management. Meanwhile, the
variables of earning power, financial leverage and company age have no
influence on earnings management and institutional ownership cannot weaken the
influence of capital intensity and earning power on earnings management.
In this study, there were some limitations, namely the
research period was only four years, using only three independent variables.
Further research can increase the research period, add independent variables
that are expected to affect earnings management actions such as operating cash
flow variables, net profit margins, and sales growth and other variables, as
well as expand the research sector.
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