Volume
4, Number 3, March 2023 e-ISSN: 2797-6068 and p-ISSN: 2777-0915
Venia Maria Djojo, Christina Dwi
Astuti
Universitas Trisakti, Indonesia
Email: [email protected], [email protected]
|
KEYWORDS Political Connection, Independent
Commissioner, sales growth and earnings management |
ABSTRACT The purpose of this research
is to analyze the effect of Political Connection, Independent Commissioner,
sales growth on earnings management. The population of this research is all
manufacturing companies in the consumer industry sector that are listed on
the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2021. There are 31 companies that
meet the criteria using the purposive sampling method. The results show that
sales growth have a positive effect on earnings management. Political
connections and independent commissioners have no effect on earnings
management. The moderating variable of company size is able to strengthen the
effect of sales growth on earnings management but is unable to strengthen the
influence of political connections and independent commissioners on earnings
management. |
INTRODUCTION
The company's
operations can run effectively with financial support from various parties such
as banks, investors and other parties. At this point, the company must make
financial statements as an accountability for the assistance it receives.
Financial statements contain information about the status and results of the
company in a certain period of time. The higher the quality of the company's
financial statements submitted, the more convincing outsiders will be when they
see the company's financial performance and decide to invest in the company.
Profit is the main focus for users of financial statements, especially for
investors, so the company will be motivated to manipulate profits so that the
company's performance looks good and attracts investors to invest (Asitalia & Trisnawati, 2017).
Earning
management is the result of misalignment of interests between managers and
company owners due to the asymmetry of information between management and
shareholders. Managers can manipulate financial statements by taking advantage
of loopholes or flexibility of applicable accounting standards. So that each
company can choose a different principle and there is no absolute truth for the
basis of the assessment. The phenomenon
of earning management that has occurred in Indonesia is based on reports on
fact-based investigations conducted by PT. Ernst and Young Indonesia on March
19, 2019, namely there were findings related to double bookkeeping and
differences in the 2017 Financial Statements (audited) data and company
internal data conducted by PT. Ernst and Young Indonesia. Tiga
Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk (AISA).
In addition,
other earning management cases occurred in property companies
PT Hanson Internasional Tbk
(MYRX), PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk in 2018,
PT. Sunprima Nusantara Financing and PT. Life
Insurance. This study was conducted to determine the factors that affect earning
management by testing whether there is an influence between political connections, independent
commissioners and sales growth
on earning management with company size as a moderation variable.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Agency Theory
(Jensen & Meckling, 2019) explain the relationship between agent and principal in agency theory,
where the principal is the owner of economic resources such as shareholders and
the agent is the party who manages the use and control of resources, namely the
manager. Agents are authorized to manage the use and control of company
resources. But sometimes agents act not as expected by the principal, because they want to maximize personal benefits
as the party who manages the company. Meanwhile, the principal wants to know information related to the company's
operational activities and the use of funds in the company.
According to (Eisenhardt, 1989) states that the theory of agency is explained using three assumptions of
human nature, the first, human beings are generally self-interested. Second,
humans have limited thinking about the perception of the future. Third, humans
tend to choose to avoid risks. Based on these assumptions of basic human
nature, managers tend to act on their personal interests. Self-interest can
lead the manager to commit actions that are detrimental to all parties who have
a relationship with the company he manages. In overcoming agency problems,
there are several costs that must be incurred called agency costs. According to
(Jensen & Meckling, 2019) Agency costs are divided into 3, namely monitoring costs, bonding costs,
and residual losses.
Earning management
Earning management according to (Scott, 2015) is a manager's decision to choose a certain accounting policy to achieve
certain goals by increasing profits or reducing the level of reported losses.
Accounting policies carried out by the management in controlling accrual
transactions, where financial statements are made to look quality so that they
are in demand by shareholders, creditors, and other parties to participate in
the company, but can cause various related conflicts.
According to (Scott, 2015) there are several motivations that encourage management to do earning
management, namely (1) bonus motivation, the manager will manage profits to
maximize the bonuses that will be obtained by the manager; (2) other
contracting motivation, relating to the requirements for the fulfillment of
debt agreements, it is expected that high profits can minimize the occurrence
of violations of debt agreements; (3) meet investors earnings expectations, The
reported profit is greater than investors' expectations so that the company's
stock price will increase due to predictions that the company has good
prospects; (4) Stock Offerings, companies that plan to go public have the
motivation to do earning management by reporting high profits so that the
company's share price increases. Earning management has four archetypes, namely
taking a bath, income minimization, income maximization, and income smoothing.
Political Connection
Political
connection is one of the components that influence the action of earning
management, political connection is the condition of the existence of a certain
party affiliation relationship with other parties who have political interests
or links to reach an agreement that benefits both parties (Ghonji Feshki, Khanmohammadi, &
Yazdani, 2020). One of the advantages of companies with political connections is that
there is protection from politicians for the company as a place to invest so
that managers do not have to pay too much attention to the quality of financial
reporting.
(Supatmi &
Putri, 2022) stated that there are findings that support the
agency theory, where when the company's board is connected politically, it will
encourage earning management, one of the forms of earning management actions
carried out is to maximize profits in order to get greater bonuses and these
actions can protect the company from debt agreements.
Independent Commissioner
Independent commissioners are members of the
board of commissioners who are not affiliated with the board of directors,
other commissioners, and controlling shareholders. In addition, they are free
from business relationships or other relationships because it can affect their
ability to act independently or act solely for the benefit of the company (Mardjono &
Chen, 2020). Monitoring by independent commissioners can
limit opportunistic managers because effective corporate governance can reduce
agency costs as management prioritizes the best interests of shareholders by
maximizing company resources so as to suppress earning management.
(Wimelda &
Chandra, 2018) stated that the independent board of
commissioners has no effect on earning management, meaning that the large
number of members of the independent board of commissioners does not affect the
occurrence of earning management, because they only supervise and are appointed
by the majority shareholder in the GMS so that if it is not in line with the
decision of the owner, they can replace the independent commissioner.
Sales Growth
Revenue growth
shows the success rate of the company's operations so that it can trigger a
company to modify the company's revenue to maintain revenue with an uptrend and
generate increased profit trend. So the company tends to
modify profits when there are fluctuations in sales. When a company's revenue
growth declines, management tends to do earning management because investors
like stable or increasing revenue growth
(Mardjono & Chen, 2020).
Company Size
Company size is one of the scales used to determine the size classification
of a company. Company sizes can be classified into three types, namely large,
medium, and small. People tend to be more familiar with large-sized companies
than small-sized companies. So, every decision made by a large company will
affect the community. Therefore, companies must be careful in submitting
financial statements and the presentation of these financial statements must be
accurate (Yunietha & Palupi, 2017).
According to (Arthawan & Wirasedana, 2018), the larger the size of the company, the larger it is, the higher the
demand for company information by the public, so companies tend to be careful
in determining policies that will affect the company's financial reporting.
The Age of Company
Leverage
Return on Asset
Return on Asset is
a tool used to measure a company's ability to manage company profits and
is an indicator of the company's efficiency in its business. Return on
investment measures a company's efficiency in making a profit through the use
of the company's assets. Therefore, Return on Asset is an excellent
measure of calculating the rate of return for shareholders. If the company debt
free, then the return on assets
and return on equity will be
the same (Bintara, 2021).
Hypothesis Development
The effect of political connection on earning management
Companies that
have political relationships will be more aggressive in manipulating corporate
profits. This shows that the existence of political relations in developing
countries such as Indonesia is still needed to provide various facilities in
achieving corporate goals. Political relationships are believed to
significantly help company managers achieve company growth, and serve as a
valuable resource for the company (Wati, 2022). Research conducted by (Supatmi & Putri, 2022) states that Political Connection has a positive effect on Earning
management. The results of the study are
in line with the research conducted by (Alhmood, Shaari, & Al-dhamari, 2020) and (Ghonji Feshki et al., 2020). Based on the above, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H1: political connection has a positive effect on earning management.
Effect of
Independent Commissioner on earning management
(Mardjono & Chen, 2020) stated that the existence of an independent commissioner can encourage
managers to be opportunistic and motivate managers to have the right accounting
policies. This is in line with research conducted by (Fitriana & Purwohandoko, 2022) and (Christina & Alexander, 2019) where independent commissioners have a significant effect on earning
management because independent parties have no ties or interests with
management so that they are free from managerial pressure and intervention. The
greater the number of independent commissioners, the better the quality of
oversight, along with the many demands from independents who want
transparency. The existence of an
independent commissioner will further strengthen the supervision of the board
of commissioners because it is not affiliated with the company and will reduce earning
management. The results of the research conducted by (Mardjono & Chen, 2020) and (Christina & Alexander, 2019) are in line with the research
conducted by (Fitriana & Purwohandoko, 2022). Based on the above, then the hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H2: Independent Commissioner does
not affects earning management.
The Effect of Sales
Growth on earning management
Sales growth has a negative influence on earning
management because companies tend to modify profits when there are sales
fluctuations. When a company's revenue growth declines, management tends to do earning
management because investors favor steady or increased revenue growth. While (Edison & Nugroho, 2020) stated that sales growth has a positive effect on
earning management, this shows that high
sales growth has the motivation to do earning
management to maintain profit trends
and sales trends. Year-over-year sales increases
accompanied by an annual increase in profits with unchanged financing and debt
will increase shareholder income. The conditions that occur encourage
management to carry out earning management. Based on the above, then the
hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H3: Sales Growth has a positive effect on earning management.
Company size can moderate the effect of political
connection on earning management
The size of a
company is closely related to the connections that the company has, the larger
the size of the company, the more people involved in the company's operational
activities and opens up the opportunity for greater political connections
within the company. According to (Supatmi & Putri, 2022) stated that when the company's board is connected politically, it will
encourage earning management, one of the forms of earning management actions
carried out is to maximize profits in order to get greater bonuses and these
actions can protect the company from debt agreements. Thus there is the
possibility of the company's management maximizing profits by reducing
discretionary expenses such as research and development costs, advertising
costs, sales, administrative and general costs. In this study, company size
acts as a moderation variable that is expected to moderate the influence of
Political connection on earning management.
Based on the above, then the hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H4: Company Size Strongly Strengthens the Positive Influence of
Political Connection on earning management.
Company size can moderate the Effect of Independent
Commissioners on earning management
The size of
the company will affect the number of
commissioners in a company. Where the greater
the number of commissioners, there is an opportunity for a greater number of
independent commissioners. With the large number of independent commissioners,
it is expected to further strengthen the supervision of the board of
commissioners because it is not affiliated with the company and will reduce the
earning management that will be carried out by the company's managers. In this
study, the size of the company acts as a moderation variable that is expected
to moderate the influence of independent commissioners on earning management. Based on the above, then the hypothesis can
be formulated as follows:
H5: Company size strongly
strengthens the negative influence of independent commissioners on earning management
Company size can moderate the effect of sales growth on earning management
The size of a
company will affect the amount of sales that occur in the company. Large companies usually have a network that
is already wide enough
so that it will have a
higher level of sales fluctuations
compared to small-sized companies. So that large companies experience a
tightening of revenue growth, company management tends to do earning management
because investors like stable or increased revenue growth to maintain the company's image in community.
In this study, company size acts as a moderation variable that is
expected to moderate the influence of
sales growth on earning management.
Based on the above, then the hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H6: Company size strengthens positive effect of sales
growth on earning management.
RESEARCH METHOD
Dependent Variables
Earning management measurement using real earnings management in the
journal (Ghonji Feshki et al., 2020), to calculate the
value of real earnings management is carried out by the following formula :
CFO t/Ass t-1 = β
1 (1/Ass t-1) + β 2 (s t/Ass t-1) + β3(Δ s t /Ass T-1) + εt
(1) REM = ACFO (-1) + ADIE (-1) + APRC (4) PRC t/Ass t-1 = β
1 (1 / Ass t-1) + β 2 (s it /
Ass t-1) + β 3(Δ s t / Ass t-1) + β 3(Δ s
T-1 /Ass
T-1) + εt (2 ) DIE t/Ass t-1 = β 1
(1/Ass t-1) + β 2(s T-1 /Ass T-1) + εt (3)
CFOt = Operations cash flow in period
t
Asst-1 =
The lagged total assets
St =
The annual sales
Δ st = The change in sales relative to the
prior period
Δ st-1 =
The sales in year t-1 less sales in year t-2
PRCt = The sum of the cost of goods
sold ðCOGStÞ and changes in inventory (ΔINV)
during The Year
DIEt = The total of discretionary
expenses in the period t (sum of advertising expenses,
R and D expenses, and SG and A)
st-1 =
The lagged total sales
REM = The
aggregate value of the standardized ACFO (−1), standardized APRC, and
standardized
ADIE (−1), calculated by Equation (4) to measure overall REM.
ACFO = The abnormal cash flow from
operations calculated as a residual from Equation (1)
ADIE = The
abnormal production costs calculated as a residual from Equation (2)
APRC = the
abnormal discretionary expenses calculated as a residual from Equation (3)
β1 – β4= Regression parameters
|
Variables |
Measurement |
References |
|
Independent
Variables |
|
|
|
Political
Connection |
A company is defined as
politically connected if at least one of its major shareholders or one of its
board members is a member of a government agency. 1=The company has a Political
connection 0=Company does not have a
Political connection |
(Ghonji Feshki et al., 2020) |
|
Independent Commissioner |
Number of independent
commissioners/Total Commissioners |
(Mardjono & Chen, 2020) |
|
Sales
Growth |
(Current year sales –
Previous year's sales) / Previous year's sales |
(Mardjono & Chen, 2020) |
|
Moderation
Variables |
|
|
|
Company Size |
Natural Logarithm (Total
Assets) |
(Alhmood et al., 2020) |
|
Control variables |
|
|
|
The Age of Company |
Current Year - The year the Company was formed |
(Alhmood et al., 2020) |
|
Leverage |
Total Liabilities/Total
Assets |
(Alhmood et al., 2020) |
|
Return on Asset |
Current year profit/Total
Assets |
(Choi, Chung, Kim, Kim, & Choi,
2020) |
Data Description
The population in this study is all consumer
goods industry companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the
2018-2021 period. The data analysis method in this study is panel data regression analysis.
The number of ampelous sin this study was 124 samples using the purposive sampling method during
the observation period with panel data
balance. The following are the results of the distribution of research
samples:
Table 1
Distribution of Research Samples
|
Sample Criteria |
Number of companies |
|
1.
Manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2021, |
47 |
|
2.
Inconsistent manufacturing companies use rupiah
currency in the presentation of financial statements from 2018 to 2021. |
(0) |
|
3.
Inconsistent manufacturing companies made profits
from 2018 to 2021. |
(16) |
|
Samples used in the
study |
31 |
|
Research Period |
4 years |
|
Total Observations |
124 |
Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
|
Variable |
N |
Minimum |
Maximum |
Mean |
Std.Dev |
|
EM |
124 |
0,147410 |
2,654074 |
0,886318 |
0,442423 |
|
PC |
124 |
0,000000 |
1,000000 |
0,225806 |
0,419809 |
|
KI |
124 |
0,000000 |
0,833333 |
0,390649 |
0,149794 |
|
SG |
124 |
-0,470921 |
1,273016 |
0,100810 |
0,214597 |
|
AGE |
124 |
9,000000 |
92,00000 |
42,72581 |
19,29334 |
|
LEV |
124 |
0,064120 |
0,792736 |
0,374190 |
0,166537 |
|
ROA |
124 |
0,000526 |
0,920997 |
0,120415 |
0,125530 |
|
Source : Data Processing Eviews 12 |
|
||||
Panel Data Model
Analysis
Table 3
Chow Test
|
Effect Test |
Statistics |
d.f |
Prob |
|
Cross-section F |
7,464913 |
(30,84) |
0,0000 |
|
Cross-section
Chi-square |
161,089902 |
30 |
0,0000 |
|
Source : Data Processing Eviews 12 |
|||
The results of the chow test in
table 3 show that the probability value of cross section chi square is 0.0000
< 0.05 (alpha 5%) then Ha (fixed effect model) is accepted, so there are
differences in characteristics both individually and between periods.
Table 4
Hausman Test
|
Test Summary |
Chi-Sq. Statistics |
Chi-Sq. d.f. |
Prob |
|
Cross-section
random |
12,797106 |
9 |
0,1720 |
|
Source : Data Processing Eviews 12 |
|||
The results from table 4 above
show the probability of Cross-section random 0.1720 > 0.05 (alpha 5%) then
it means that Ha is rejected. It can be concluded that based on the results of
the hausman test the right model is the Random effect model.
Table 5
Test Lagrange
Multiplier
|
Test Hypothesis |
|||
|
|
Cross-Section |
Time |
Both |
|
Breusch-Pagan |
54,72139 (0,00000) |
1,870952 (0,1714) |
56,59234 (0,00000) |
|
Source : Data Processing Eviews 12 |
|||
The result from table 5 above
shows the probability of the Breusch-Pagan
Cross-section 0.00000 < 0.05 (alpha 5%) then it means that Ha is
accepted. It can be concluded that based on the results of the Lagrange Multiplier test, the right
model is a Random effect model.
Hypothesis Testing
Table 6
Hypothesis Test
|
Variable |
Coefficient |
Sig |
Conclusion |
|
PC |
2,348826 |
0,2665 |
H1 Declined |
|
KI |
-3,704757 |
0,2128 |
H2 Rejected |
|
SG |
8,432372 |
0,0154 |
H3 Accepted |
|
PC*SIZE |
-0,081764 |
0,2469 |
H4 Rejected |
|
KI*SIZE |
0,122077 |
0,2177 |
H5 Rejected |
|
SG*SIZE |
0,267805 |
0,0297 |
H6 Accepted |
|
AGE |
-0,000655 |
0,8375 |
|
|
LEV |
-0,221162 |
0,3599 |
|
|
ROA |
-0,430585 |
0,1331 |
|
|
C |
0,951560 |
0,0000 |
|
|
Adjusted R-Squared |
0.343867 |
|
|
|
Prob (F-statistic) |
0.000000 |
|
|
|
Source : Data Processing Eviews 12 |
|||
Based on Table 6, the regression model obtained is:
EM = 0.951560 + 2.348826PC -
3.704757KI + 8.432372SG - 0.081764PC*SIZE + 0.122077KI*SIZE - 0.267805SG*SIZE -
0.000655AGE - 0.221162LEV - 0.430585ROA.
DISCUSSION
The Effect of Political Connection on earning management
Table 6 shows that the sig.
political connection value of 0.1333 > 0.05
indicates that political connection has no effect on earning management. This
shows that H1 is not accepted, meaning that political connections do not affect
the occurrence of earning management because politically connected companies
tend to be more supervised by the public. This condition causes companies to be
riskier to be more careful in carrying out earning management practices because
the actions taken by the company will be highlighted by public.
Effect of Independent Commissioner on earning management
Table 6 shows that the sig value.
Independent commissioners of 0.1064 > 0.05 indicate that independent
commissioners have no effect on earning management. This shows that H2 is not
accepted, meaning that political connections do not affect the occurrence of earning
management because the large number of independent board of commissioners does
not affect the occurrence of earning management, because they only supervise
and are appointed by the majority shareholders in the GMS so that if it is not
in line with the owner's decision, they can replace the independent
commissioners (Wimelda & Chandra, 2018)
Effect of Sales Growth on earning management
Table 6 shows that the sig. sales
growth of 0.0077 < 0.05 shows that sales growth has a positive effect on earning
management. This indicates that H3 is accepted, meaning that high sales growth
has the motivation to carry out earning management to maintain profit trends
and sales trends. The year-over-year increase in sales is accompanied by an
annual increase in profits with unchanged financing and debt will increase
shareholder income. The conditions that occur encourage management to carry out
earning management.
Effect of Company Size in moderating Political Connection on earning
management
Table 6 shows that the role of
company size in moderating the political connection to earning management has a
sig value. 0.1235 > 0.05 indicates
the size of the company cannot strengthen the influence of political connection
on earning management. This shows that H4 is not accepted, meaning that the
size of the company is not able to strengthen or weaken the influence of
political connection on earning management because large companies that have
political relationships tend to be highlighted by the public.
Effect of Company Size in moderating Independent commissioners on earning
management
Table 6 shows that the role of
company size in moderating independent Commissioners towards earning management
has a sig value. 0.1089 > 0.05
indicates the size of the company cannot strengthen the influence of the independent
Commissioner on earning management. This shows that H5 is not accepted, meaning
that the size of the company is not able to strengthen or weaken the influence
of independent commissioners on earning management because independent
commissioners can be replaced if they are not in line with the owner's decision without considering the
size of the company.
Effect of Company Size in moderating Sales Growth on earning management
Table 6 shows that the role of
company size in moderating sales growth to earning management has a sig
value. 0.0149 < 0.05 indicates that
the size of the company can strengthen the effect of sales growth on earning
management. This shows that H6 is accepted, meaning that large companies are
dealing with sales growth, so company management tends to do earning management
because investors like stable or increased sales growth to maintain the
company's image in society (Edison and Nugroho, 2020). This shows that the size
of a company will strengthen the possibility of company management doing earning
management.
CONCLUSION
Based on the
results of the analysis and discussion that has been carried out, it can be
concluded that sales growth has a positive effect on earning management. Political connections and independent
commissioners have no effect on earning management. The moderation variable of
company size can strengthen the influence of sales growth on earning management
but is not able to strengthen the influence of political connections and independent
commissioners on earning management.
REFERENCES
Alhmood, M. A., Shaari, H., & Al-dhamari, R. (2020). CEO
characteristics and real earnings management in Jordan. International
Journal of Financial Research, 11(4), 255–266.
Arthawan, P. T., & Wirasedana, W. P. (2018). Pengaruh
kepemilikan manajerial, kebijakan utang dan ukuran perusahaan terhadap
manajemen laba. E-Jurnal Akuntansi, 22(1), 1–29.
Asitalia, F., & Trisnawati, I. (2017). Pengaruh good
corporate governance dan leverage terhadap manajemen laba. Jurnal Bisnis Dan
Akuntansi, 19(1a-2), 109–119.
Bintara, R. (2021). ASEAN corporate governance scorecard,
profitability, and disclosure of corporate social responsibility on earnings
management. International Journal Of Management Studies And Social Science
Research.
Choi, D., Chung, C. Y., Kim, Y.-E., Kim, Y. J., & Choi,
P. M. S. (2020). Sustainable corporate ownership structures and earnings
management in the Vietnamese stock market. Sustainability, 12(15),
6089.
Christina, S., & Alexander, N. (2019). Corporate
governance, corporate social responsibility disclosure and earnings management.
5th Annual International Conference on Accounting Research (AICAR 2018),
62–65. Atlantis Press.
Edison, A., & Nugroho, A. P. A. (2020). The Effect of
Leverage and Sales Growth on Earning Management. PalArch’s Journal of
Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 17(4), 3442–3454.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and
review. Academy of management review, 14(1), 57–74.
Fitriana, N. L., & Purwohandoko, P. (2022). Pengaruh
Leverage, Likuiditas dan Profitabilitas terhadap Nilai Perusahaan pada Airlines
Company Listed IDX 2011-2020. Jurnal Ilmu Manajemen, 10(1),
39–50.
Ghonji Feshki, A., Khanmohammadi, M. H., & Yazdani, S.
(2020). Political connection and earnings management methods: evidence from
Tehran stock exchange. International Journal of Finance & Managerial
Accounting, 5(17), 1–17.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (2019). Theory of the
firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. In Corporate
Governance (bll 77–132). Gower.
Kalbuana, N., Suryati, A., & Pertiwi, C. P. A. (2022).
Effect of Company Age, Audit Quality, Leverage and Profitability on Earnings
Management. International Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting
Research (IJEBAR), 6(1), 305–315.
Mardjono, E. S., & Chen, Y.-S. (2020). Earning management
and the effect characteristics of audit committee, independent commissioners:
Evidence from Indonesia. International Journal of Business and Society, 21(2),
569–587.
Scott, J. W. (2015). Bordering, border politics and
cross-border cooperation in Europe. Neighbourhood policy and the
construction of the European external borders, 27–44.
Supatmi, S., & Putri, I. D. (2022). Pengaruh Koneksi
Politik Terhadap Praktik Manajemen Laba Riil Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur di
Indonesia. Owner: Riset dan Jurnal Akuntansi, 6(3), 3028–3039.
Wati, E. (2022). Pengaruh Karakteristik CEO dan Hubungan
Politik Terhadap Manajemen Laba Riil. Fair Value: Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi
dan Keuangan, 4(Spesial Issue 3), 1288–1303.
Wimelda, L., & Chandra, A. (2018). Opportunistic
behavior, external monitoring mechanisms, corporate governance, and earnings
management. Accounting and Finance Review, 3(1), 44–52.
Yunietha, Y., & Palupi, A. (2017). Pengaruh corporate
governance dan faktor lainnya terhadap manajemen laba perusahaan publik non
keuangan. Jurnal Bisnis Dan Akuntansi, 19(1a-4), 292–303.
Copyright Holders:
Venia Maria Djojo, Christina Dwi Astuti (2023)
First publication
right:
Devotion - Journal
of Research and Community Service
This article is licensed under
a Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International