Amalia Syauket

98 http://devotion.greenvest.co.id

Volume 3, No. 2, December 2021

p- ISSN 2777-0915 | e-ISSN 2797-6068

NEPOTISTIC CORRUPTION BREEDING FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLITICAL DYNASTY

Amalia Syauket

Participants of the 2021 Visiting Professor-UMM Program

E-mail: amalia.s[email protected]ajaya.ac.id

Keywords

Nepotistic

Corruption, Political

Dynasty, Pilkada

Article Info

Accepted:

November, 24

2021

Revised:

December, 4

2021

Approved:

December, 13

2021

Abstract Simultaneous Pilkada 2020 is still dwelling on

the same pattern of problems from the previous Pilkada

which actually experienced a significant increase in the

journey of regional heads who came from the Political

Dynasty. A total of 124 candidates are affiliated with

political dynasties. One of them is caused by the double-

edged sword of decentralization and regional autonomy.

In addition to giving power to the regions in forming

their own households, decentralization of regional

autonomy triggers the decentralization of corruption

that spreads to various regions which then drags the

political elite. This is what causes regional autonomy to

encourage oligarchic decentralization and the practice of

political dynasties. The "little kings" in the regions that

were born from regional autonomy finally made the

Pilkada a power defense industry that was also

correlated with the defense of wealth. This research

article uses a qualitative approach with a

phenomenological type, prioritizing secondary data, with

the 4M writing technique, namely Describing, Analyzing,

Concluding and Describing the phenomenon of

nepotistic corruption which is the seed of political

dynasties to answer the problem of how nepotistic

corruption forms a political dynasty. The conclusions

drawn from this research, this type of corruption refers

to preferential treatment given to children, wives, nieces

or close relatives of officials at every level, and every

route in the formation of political dynasties in other

words nepotistic corruption is the seed in the formation

Amalia Syauket

Nepotistic Corruption Breeding for The Establishment of a Political Dynasty 99

Introduction

The development of democracy through direct elections, on the one hand,

deserves appreciation, but on the other hand, it should not be too late in the

trappings of democratic formalities. The formalities of democracy not only

threaten the survival of democracy in Indonesia, but can also create a political

regime that only works to serve power, not serve the people who are the source

of true sovereignty. This is what is often referred to as Pilkada which results in a

pseudo-democracy, full of formalities and fails to produce a power that serves

the interests of the people. The results of the Nagara Institute Research show

that the democratic formalities practiced in the 2020 Simultaneous Regional

Head Elections gave birth to political dynasties (Syauket, 2021). There are 124

candidates affiliated with political dynasties, which are almost evenly

distributed in 270 constituencies at both the Province-Kabupaten and City

levels. Meanwhile, when viewed from the supporting parties, it appears that the

Golkar Party is the largest party carrying political dynasties, followed by PDI-P

and Nasdem.

From a theoretical point of view, elections are the most important means and

instrument of democratization. However, the realization of democracy will be

felt in real terms when the general election process is held in order to

determine the candidate for the leader who is worthy of holding the reins of

power (Fitriciada, 2004). Without this step, the truth of democracy as a means

of realizing people's sovereignty still invites a number of separate problems that

open up space for the emergence of claims for the legitimacy of the ruling

government. The belief in elections as the most important instrument for

democratization gains strong legitimacy from Samuel.P Huntington (Azhari,

2004) .

Since the Direct Pilkada was held in 2015, democracy at the local level has

experienced significant dynamics. Direct Pilkada and Simultaneous Pilkada are

one of the significant political breakthroughs in realizing democratization at the

local level. Because before 2005, Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads

were elected by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). Only

of Political Dynasties. because the family as the main

pillar in the formation of a political dynasty.

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since the enactment of Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional

Government, Regional Heads are directly elected by the people through the

Election of Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads/Pilkada. The first Pilkada

was held in June 2005 in Kutai Kertanegara Regency, East Kalimantan. The

implementation of the Pilkada in the first phase was not carried out

simultaneously, but separately from one region to another. Meanwhile,

nationally, according to (Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009) that in 2005 Indonesia had

the first experience of directly electing a national leader and this was the initial

momentum of democracy in Indonesia.

Unfortunately, until the 2020 Simultaneous Pilkada, the political dynamics

showed a blurry portrait, namely the emergence of a Political Dynasty which

according to various sources was called the "2020 Simultaneous Election of

Many Political Dynasties", even Koran Tempo featured a cover story "Family

Party in Power" on the 20 July 2020 Edition.

Research Method

This study uses a qualitative approach with a phenomenological type, in order

to see the symptoms of the government of the formation of a Political Dynasty

in Indonesia. The issue of political dynasties in Indonesia has emerged since the

transition period after the end of the Suharto regime to substantive democracy.

This approach as explained by Alase18 phenomenology is a qualitative

methodology that allows researchers to apply and apply their subjectivity and

interpersonal skills in the exploratory research process. This study prioritizes

secondary data sources in the form of literature studies aimed at finding a

problem to be researched, seeking information relevant to the problem to be

studied, reviewing some basic theories relevant to the problem to be studied.

Result and Discussion

A. Nepotistic Corruption

There are many definitions of corruption. From these various definitions Nye, J.S

stated that corruption is defined as behavior that deviates from formal ethical

rules concerning the actions of a person in a position of public authority caused

by personal considerations, such as wealth, power and status11.

Amalia Syauket

Nepotistic Corruption Breeding for The Establishment of a Political Dynasty 101

In relation to the Simultaneous Pilkada, the practice of clientelism according to

(Katz & Crotty, 2015), (Crotty, 2014) or (Rais, 1993) and (ISMANSYAH, Wahyuni,

& MUCHTAR, 2020) calls it Nepotistic Corroption is something that often occurs.

This practice is even mushrooming in electoral practice in Indonesia. Arlan

Siddha in (Syauket, 2021) describes a clientelism or nepotistic model in the

Simultaneous Pilkada, including:

(1). Party as Patron and Candidate as Client, which is indicated by a magic letter

in the form of party recommendation,

(2). The clientelism relationship between the candidate and the success team,

where the candidate is the patron and the successful team is the client, which is

shown through the provision of gifts in the form of rations for government

projects,

(3). Clientelism between candidates and constituents, where candidates are

patrons and constituents are clients, which is indicated by the provision of

money and positions in government.

Amin Rais in (Sanusi, 2009) and Syed Hussein Al'Atas explains that this type of

nepotistic or kinship corruption refers to preferential treatment given to

children, in-laws, nephews, wives or close relatives of officials in each echelon.

With preferential treatment, the son, daughter-in-law, niece and wife of the

official can reap as much profit as possible. Nepotistic corruption in general goes

by violating the existing rules of the game, which according to (Diansyah, 2009)

cannot be separated from the element of abuse of authority/position 10.

However, these violations cannot be stopped because behind the nepotistic

corruption stands an official who usually feels above the law.

In line with this, (George Junus Aditjondro, 2006) classifies there are three layers

of corruption, in the second layer, in the type of Nepotism Corruption among

those who have blood relations with public officials, examples of which include:

1. adopt a child or son-in-law in a public position such as the Head of Service,

Head of Section,

2. Placing children in important positions in political parties such as the chairman

of the DPP or the secretary general of the party,

3. Placing children, wives, daughters-in-law, grandchildren as candidates for

Regional Head or DPRD members,

4. Determining family members as winners of development projects or purchases

of goods originating from the State budget.

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The element of profit-taking as much as possible in this actually refers to one of

the three types of income according to Adam Smith, namely profit, wages and

rents. Rent, referred to as the easiest form of income. No need for risk, no need

for specific skills just because it's based on blood or kinship. The definition of

rent in a broad sense, is transformed as a nature of business actors to gain

profits, but not using their own resources such as capital/own property. Rent

hunters use other people's property rights, public property rights and even state

facilities to accumulate profits, according to (Rachbini & Sikumbank, 2006) this is

called rent seeking behavior. Thus the behavior of rent-seeking, which basically

emphasizes self-interest in this case the family, political clan or business clan is

actually against the public interest or detrimental to the public. The point of

contact between the “rent-seeking behavior” approach to corruption lies at the

heart of the rent-seeking theory itself, namely the use of public facilities, state

power and a number of dirty transactions for the benefit of a few parties10.

B. Routes for the Establishment of Political Dynasties

Twenty years after the 1998 reform, political dynasties thrived like mushrooms in

the rainy season. Political dynasties can be found in all supporting political

parties, at all levels of government and in various regions in Indonesia. Based on

the National Research Institute, in the 2020 Simultaneous Regional Head

Elections, which were participated by 270 regions, were held in 9 provinces, 224

regencies and 37 cities. It appears that half of the provinces hold pilkada

affiliated with the Political Dynasty. The most exposed to political dynasties in

the district elections. The route or plot in building a Political Dynasty can be

described as follows:

Source: processed from various literatures, 2021.

Menempatkan Anak,mantu,kerabat

dlm jabatan strategis

Mendorong Istri maju

Pilkada,anak,mantu sebagai

anggota DPRD

Amalia Syauket

Nepotistic Corruption Breeding for The Establishment of a Political Dynasty 103

The picture above describes the route before the local strongman or Local

Strongman according to the terms of (Suaza Estrada & Martínez Márquez, 2016)

while (Holifah, 2018) calls it Local Bossism to build a political dynasty and

become an oligarchic group. In the first stage, Before establishing a political

dynasty, local strongmen were nothing. They generally come from the social

strata of ordinary people who then advance to contest the Pilkada, win the

Pilkada and in the end they collect capital sourced from local government

projects. The goal in this first stage is to seize power. The second stage, after

they have obtained sufficient capital, they run again in the Pilkada as

incumbents, with the aim of maintaining power by expanding their power over

projects and buying and selling positions in government, managing government

projects and aspiration funds, arranging regional regulations, arranging tax

breaks , arrange loans from BPD, the goal to be achieved in this second stage is

to use power to accumulate capital to accumulate wealth. The third stage, when

the incumbent succeeds in becoming a regional head for two periods, they begin

to build their political dynasty by encouraging their wives, children, daughters-in-

law, and in-laws to run in the elections with the wealth that has been obtained in

the second stage. With the mode of exploitation of economic resources: carry

out illegal economic collections such as gambling, smuggling, illegal logging.

Victory in the Pilkada to return assets that have been issued in the Pilkada.

The Political Dynasty Model in the 2020 Simultaneous Pilkada has another

variant, namely competition between political dynasties. The first model is a

competition for regional head candidates contested by several political

dynasties. The competition for candidates for regional heads is fair even though

it is plagued by political dynasties, because the competition that is built has a

balanced power base, namely the battle between dynasties. The second model is

competition between "fellow" political dynasties in the same family, for example

the competition between wives-in-laws-nieces and nephews. This oligarchy is by

buying political parties, which means an entrepreneur's affair with the Chair of a

Political Party in order to finance a series of political processes, determine Party

Decisions and Recommendations, facilitate certain candidates to be elected with

the aim of controlling political parties and expanding their access and control

over regional economic resources. In order to strengthen the Oligarchy, the

Political Dynasties Circle will then take care of each other's interests in order to

strengthen the Oligarchy entering the fourth stage, with the mode of buying

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political party policies, controlling political parties, strengthening political cartels

with the type of network corruption (cabal) in the Third Layer according to

(George J Aditjondro, Keith, & Francisco, 2000).

Political dynasties are still possible because of the opportunity, the absence of

strict rules that prohibit especially those related to nepotism, thrives in a

permissive society with low levels of education..

Conclusion

Nepotistic Corruption refers to preferential treatment given to children, wives,

nieces or close relatives of officials at every level, and is present in every route

in the formation of a political dynasty to reap as much profit as possible, in

other words, nepotistic corruption is a seed in the formation of a dynasty.

Politics because the family is the main pillar in the formation of a corrupt

political dynasty. The contribution of this research more broadly, as part of the

mind and energy to continue to oversee the eradication of corruption in

Indonesia.

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Amalia Syauket

(2021)

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